Trends in Australia's Trade Pattern
How Australia's trade has changed in value, composition and direction since the 1970s, why a commodity exporter's trade balance swings with world prices, and what the move from Britain to Japan to China says about where its comparative advantage lies.
45 min · HSC Topic Two - Australia's Place in the Global Economy
Assumes you have read Trade in Goods and Services.
The full teaching. Start here.
The short version
- Value. Exports plus imports rose from 27 per cent of GDP in 1959-60 to 46.8 per cent in 2025-26, peaking at 49.1 per cent in 2022-23. Exports were A$681.0 billion in 2025-26 and imports A$688.5 billion.
- The balance swings with commodity prices. A record goods and services surplus of A$122.2 billion in 2021-22 shrank to A$15.0 billion in 2024-25 and became a deficit of A$7.5 billion in 2025-26, the first annual deficit since 2015-16.
- Composition of exports. Rural goods were the largest category in 1970-71 at 39 per cent. Resources and energy are now 58 per cent, including gold at 10.6 per cent. Services are 21.4 per cent, rural goods 11.4 and manufactures 7.3.
- Composition of imports has barely moved: intermediate goods about 30 per cent, services about a quarter, consumption goods about a fifth, capital goods about a sixth.
- Direction. Britain, then Japan, then China. China overtook Japan in 2009, peaked at 36.6 per cent of exports in 2020 and took 29.4 per cent in 2025. Japan has fallen to 9.8 per cent.
The judgement the exam wants: Australia's trade pattern is set by comparative advantage in resources and by the industrialisation of its Asian neighbours. That made it richer and made its trade balance and export income depend on world commodity prices and on one buyer.
Why Australia trades what it trades
AnswersWhy is Australia's trade pattern the way it is?
Australia produces under 2 per cent of world output and is a small open economy. Its trade follows its comparative advantage. A very large endowment of land and minerals makes it a low opportunity cost producer of iron ore, coal, gas, gold and farm goods. A highly educated workforce makes it an exporter of services such as education, tourism and professional services.
The other half follows from its size. With a small population, Australia cannot make everything at an efficient scale, so it imports what it does not produce: capital equipment, elaborately transformed manufactures, fuel and consumer goods.
- Internationalisation
The process by which an economy becomes more closely linked to the rest of the world through trade, capital flows and the adoption of market based policies. For Australia this was largely a policy decision taken from the 1980s.
Australia's internationalisation came in two stages, and each one explains part of the pattern.
Policy from 1983. The dollar was floated and the financial system deregulated in December 1983, giving firms access to world capital markets. Tariffs, quotas, subsidies and local content rules were cut across the board through the 1980s and 1990s, which exposed manufacturers to import competition and pushed them to export. Australia pursued access for its farm exports through the Cairns Group of agricultural exporters, APEC, the Uruguay Round that created the World Trade Organisation, and then a series of bilateral and regional agreements.
Demand from Asia. Japan's industrialisation made it the largest buyer of Australian minerals from the late 1960s. China's much larger industrialisation from the 2000s produced a resources boom that changed the value, composition and direction of Australia's trade at the same time, and lifted the terms of trade and the dollar with them.
What lifts this to a Band 6
Name both causes and keep them apart. Trade liberalisation explains why Australia trades more. Asian industrialisation explains why it trades resources, with Asia. A response that credits all of the change to either one has lost half of the argument.
Value: how much Australia trades
AnswersHow has the value of Australia's trade changed?
- Imports, % of GDP
- Exports, % of GDP
The numbers behind this graph
| Financial year | Exports, % of GDP | Imports, % of GDP | Openness, % of GDP |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1959-60 | 13.0 | 14.0 | 27.0 |
| 1960-61 | 12.4 | 14.9 | 27.3 |
| 1961-62 | 13.9 | 12.6 | 26.5 |
| 1962-63 | 12.9 | 13.8 | 26.7 |
| 1963-64 | 14.9 | 13.8 | 28.7 |
| 1964-65 | 13.2 | 15.3 | 28.5 |
| 1965-66 | 12.9 | 15.1 | 28.0 |
| 1966-67 | 12.8 | 13.9 | 26.7 |
| 1967-68 | 12.2 | 14.4 | 26.6 |
| 1968-69 | 11.9 | 13.3 | 25.2 |
| 1969-70 | 12.9 | 13.2 | 26.1 |
| 1970-71 | 12.6 | 12.9 | 25.5 |
| 1971-72 | 12.8 | 12.0 | 24.8 |
| 1972-73 | 14.1 | 11.0 | 25.1 |
| 1973-74 | 13.1 | 13.2 | 26.3 |
| 1974-75 | 14.2 | 14.7 | 28.9 |
| 1975-76 | 13.4 | 13.3 | 26.7 |
| 1976-77 | 14.0 | 14.6 | 28.6 |
| 1977-78 | 13.6 | 14.5 | 28.1 |
| 1978-79 | 14.2 | 15.3 | 29.5 |
| 1979-80 | 16.4 | 15.9 | 32.3 |
| 1980-81 | 14.9 | 16.8 | 31.7 |
| 1981-82 | 13.5 | 16.8 | 30.3 |
| 1982-83 | 13.5 | 15.5 | 29.0 |
| 1983-84 | 13.5 | 15.0 | 28.5 |
| 1984-85 | 15.2 | 17.2 | 32.4 |
| 1985-86 | 14.9 | 18.1 | 33.0 |
| 1986-87 | 15.5 | 17.1 | 32.6 |
| 1987-88 | 15.9 | 16.6 | 32.5 |
| 1988-89 | 15.1 | 16.9 | 32.0 |
| 1989-90 | 15.1 | 17.0 | 32.1 |
| 1990-91 | 16.0 | 16.1 | 32.1 |
| 1991-92 | 16.6 | 16.4 | 33.0 |
| 1992-93 | 17.5 | 17.9 | 35.4 |
| 1993-94 | 18.0 | 18.5 | 36.5 |
| 1994-95 | 17.9 | 19.8 | 37.7 |
| 1995-96 | 18.8 | 19.3 | 38.1 |
| 1996-97 | 19.1 | 18.8 | 37.9 |
| 1997-98 | 19.5 | 20.4 | 39.9 |
| 1998-99 | 18.3 | 20.7 | 39.0 |
| 1999-00 | 19.3 | 21.5 | 40.8 |
| 2000-01 | 22.1 | 22.0 | 44.1 |
| 2001-02 | 20.7 | 20.7 | 41.4 |
| 2002-03 | 19.0 | 21.1 | 40.1 |
| 2003-04 | 17.1 | 19.9 | 37.0 |
| 2004-05 | 18.2 | 20.9 | 39.1 |
| 2005-06 | 19.8 | 21.6 | 41.4 |
| 2006-07 | 20.1 | 21.8 | 41.9 |
| 2007-08 | 20.1 | 22.7 | 42.8 |
| 2008-09 | 22.9 | 22.6 | 45.5 |
| 2009-10 | 19.7 | 20.7 | 40.4 |
| 2010-11 | 21.4 | 20.4 | 41.8 |
| 2011-12 | 21.4 | 21.6 | 43.0 |
| 2012-13 | 19.9 | 21.2 | 41.1 |
| 2013-14 | 21.0 | 21.3 | 42.3 |
| 2014-15 | 20.0 | 21.5 | 41.5 |
| 2015-16 | 19.2 | 21.6 | 40.8 |
| 2016-17 | 21.2 | 20.9 | 42.1 |
| 2017-18 | 21.8 | 21.8 | 43.6 |
| 2018-19 | 24.1 | 22.0 | 46.1 |
| 2019-20 | 23.9 | 20.5 | 44.4 |
| 2020-21 | 21.9 | 18.2 | 40.1 |
| 2021-22 | 25.4 | 20.2 | 45.6 |
| 2022-23 | 26.7 | 22.4 | 49.1 |
| 2023-24 | 24.7 | 22.6 | 47.3 |
| 2024-25 | 23.3 | 22.8 | 46.1 |
| 2025-26 | 23.3 | 23.5 | 46.8 |
- Exports in 2025-26
- 23.3 per cent of GDP
- Imports
- 23.5 per cent of GDP
- Trade openness, exports plus imports
- 46.8 per cent of GDP, against 27.0 per cent in 1959-60
- What was happening
- The first annual trade deficit since 2015-16, with record fuel and vehicle imports during trade disruptions in the Middle East.
- How it is measured
- Goods and services credits and debits as ratios to GDP, seasonally adjusted, averaged over the four quarters of each financial year. Openness is the sum of the two.
- Source
- Australian Bureau of Statistics, Balance of Payments and International Investment Position, Australia, Table 30, Balance of payments summary, financial year; Table 23 for the ratios. June quarter 2026 release.
Every slider is a normal range input, so the arrow keys move it one step and Home and End jump to the extremes.
The first view shows the level. Exports and imports each ran at 13 to 15 per cent of GDP through the 1960s and 1970s, rose after the float and the tariff cuts, and are now about 23 per cent each. Trade openness has risen from 27 per cent of GDP in 1959-60 to 46.8 per cent in 2025-26.
That is low for an economy that depends so much on trade. Large, distant economies trade less relative to their output than small economies inside a manufacturing supply chain, and much of what Australia produces, including housing, health, education and government services, is not traded at all. Compare Australia with itself over time, not with Singapore.
The second view shows the balance, and it tells a different story. The balance on goods and services was usually a small deficit through the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s. From 2019 it became a run of very large surpluses, a record A$122.2 billion in 2021-22 and A$112.3 billion in 2022-23, then fell to A$56.2 billion in 2023-24 and A$15.0 billion in 2024-25, and turned to a deficit of A$7.5 billion in 2025-26.
Chain of reasoning
Why the balance swings so far
World prices of iron ore, coal and gas rises
Chinese steel demand, Russia's invasion of Ukraine and supply problems lifted commodity prices between 2019 and 2022.
Export income rises
Australia sells these goods at world prices, and the quantity shipped hardly changes when prices move. A price rise therefore adds tens of billions of dollars to export income with almost no extra resources used.
Balance on goods and services rises
Imports follow domestic spending, which moves slowly, so the rise in export income appears almost entirely in the balance.
The reverse, 2023 to 2026 falls
Coal, gas and then iron ore prices fell while imports kept rising with population and spending. In 2025-26 a jump in fuel and vehicle imports during trade disruptions in the Middle East pushed the balance into deficit.
Where it breaks: The level of trade changes slowly because it is structural. The balance changes quickly because the prices of a few commodities dominate export income.
Common mistake
The trade surplus shrank from 2022 to 2026 because Australia exported less.
Why it happens: A smaller surplus sounds like less being sold.
Exports were A$681.0 billion in 2025-26, higher than the A$595.0 billion of 2021-22. Most of the fall in the surplus came from lower prices for coal and gas and from imports growing, from A$472.8 billion in 2021-22 to A$688.5 billion in 2025-26. Say whether a change is in prices or in quantities.
CheckpointAnswer before reading on.
Australia's balance on goods and services was a surplus of A$122.2 billion in 2021-22 and a deficit of A$7.5 billion in 2025-26. Exports were A$595.0 billion in 2021-22 and A$681.0 billion in 2025-26.
Explain why the balance on goods and services moved from a large surplus to a deficit even though the value of exports rose. (3 marks)
Hint 1The balance is exports minus imports. If exports rose and the balance fell, look at the other side.
Hint 2Work out imports in each year from the figures given.
Hint 3Then explain why export income stopped rising as fast as imports: what happened to the prices of coal, gas and iron ore after 2022?
Composition of exports: from wool and wheat to ore and gas
AnswersHow has the composition of Australia's exports changed?
- Resources and energy, incl. gold
- Services
- Rural goods
- Manufactures
- Gold, already inside resources
The numbers behind this graph
| Financial year | Resources, % | Rural, % | Manufactures, % | Services, % | Other goods, % | Of which gold, % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1970-71 | 27.3 | 39.3 | 11.9 | 16.5 | 5.0 | 0.4 |
| 1971-72 | 26.4 | 39.5 | 12.1 | 16.4 | 5.5 | 0.4 |
| 1972-73 | 25.2 | 44.6 | 11.2 | 13.2 | 5.8 | 0.4 |
| 1973-74 | 27.9 | 42.6 | 10.5 | 13.4 | 5.5 | 0.4 |
| 1974-75 | 33.0 | 32.3 | 10.6 | 14.8 | 9.4 | 0.5 |
| 1975-76 | 34.4 | 34.1 | 8.7 | 14.4 | 8.3 | 0.4 |
| 1976-77 | 35.7 | 34.9 | 8.0 | 13.7 | 7.7 | 0.3 |
| 1977-78 | 36.5 | 33.7 | 8.4 | 14.6 | 6.9 | 0.3 |
| 1978-79 | 34.9 | 34.7 | 9.1 | 15.8 | 5.5 | 0.5 |
| 1979-80 | 33.5 | 36.9 | 8.7 | 14.2 | 6.7 | 0.5 |
| 1980-81 | 33.0 | 33.1 | 9.4 | 15.8 | 8.8 | 0.2 |
| 1981-82 | 35.5 | 32.0 | 10.0 | 17.0 | 5.6 | 0.4 |
| 1982-83 | 39.6 | 28.4 | 10.0 | 17.1 | 4.9 | 1.1 |
| 1983-84 | 39.4 | 28.7 | 10.1 | 17.0 | 4.8 | 1.4 |
| 1984-85 | 41.2 | 29.5 | 9.4 | 15.8 | 4.2 | 1.7 |
| 1985-86 | 40.6 | 29.6 | 9.0 | 16.5 | 4.3 | 2.9 |
| 1986-87 | 38.1 | 28.2 | 11.4 | 17.8 | 4.5 | 4.6 |
| 1987-88 | 36.9 | 28.3 | 11.3 | 19.1 | 4.5 | 6.0 |
| 1988-89 | 36.7 | 27.2 | 11.0 | 20.4 | 4.6 | 5.4 |
| 1989-90 | 39.3 | 23.3 | 12.6 | 19.9 | 5.0 | 6.2 |
| 1990-91 | 41.3 | 19.6 | 14.1 | 20.9 | 4.1 | 6.2 |
| 1991-92 | 39.1 | 21.1 | 14.7 | 21.2 | 3.8 | 6.5 |
| 1992-93 | 37.6 | 20.5 | 15.9 | 22.0 | 4.1 | 5.9 |
| 1993-94 | 34.8 | 20.4 | 17.1 | 23.1 | 4.6 | 6.6 |
| 1994-95 | 33.5 | 19.5 | 18.1 | 24.2 | 4.7 | 5.5 |
| 1995-96 | 33.8 | 19.6 | 18.4 | 23.6 | 4.6 | 5.9 |
| 1996-97 | 33.4 | 19.8 | 18.5 | 23.9 | 4.5 | 6.5 |
| 1997-98 | 34.8 | 19.2 | 18.1 | 23.1 | 4.8 | 6.3 |
| 1998-99 | 33.8 | 19.2 | 17.8 | 24.7 | 4.5 | 5.9 |
| 1999-00 | 34.7 | 18.4 | 18.1 | 24.0 | 4.8 | 5.1 |
| 2000-01 | 35.7 | 18.6 | 17.5 | 23.3 | 5.0 | 4.0 |
| 2001-02 | 35.3 | 19.2 | 17.5 | 22.8 | 5.2 | 4.2 |
| 2002-03 | 35.2 | 16.6 | 17.7 | 24.3 | 6.2 | 5.0 |
| 2003-04 | 33.3 | 16.5 | 17.1 | 26.2 | 6.8 | 4.7 |
| 2004-05 | 37.6 | 15.2 | 15.7 | 24.2 | 7.3 | 3.8 |
| 2005-06 | 43.8 | 12.7 | 14.3 | 22.4 | 6.8 | 4.6 |
| 2006-07 | 44.8 | 11.4 | 13.3 | 22.8 | 7.6 | 4.9 |
| 2007-08 | 46.7 | 10.7 | 13.2 | 23.0 | 6.3 | 5.2 |
| 2008-09 | 54.3 | 10.1 | 10.9 | 20.2 | 4.5 | 6.0 |
| 2009-10 | 52.1 | 9.9 | 11.0 | 21.8 | 5.2 | 5.5 |
| 2010-11 | 57.3 | 10.0 | 9.4 | 18.8 | 4.5 | 4.7 |
| 2011-12 | 58.2 | 10.8 | 9.3 | 17.6 | 4.1 | 5.2 |
| 2012-13 | 55.7 | 11.8 | 9.5 | 19.0 | 4.0 | 5.3 |
| 2013-14 | 56.7 | 11.8 | 9.2 | 18.8 | 3.5 | 4.2 |
| 2014-15 | 51.5 | 13.1 | 10.0 | 21.6 | 3.8 | 4.4 |
| 2015-16 | 48.4 | 13.5 | 10.8 | 23.7 | 3.7 | 5.6 |
| 2016-17 | 53.1 | 12.5 | 9.1 | 22.0 | 3.4 | 5.3 |
| 2017-18 | 54.8 | 11.7 | 8.7 | 21.8 | 3.1 | 5.0 |
| 2018-19 | 58.2 | 10.2 | 8.5 | 20.6 | 2.6 | 4.2 |
| 2019-20 | 59.5 | 9.8 | 8.5 | 19.5 | 2.6 | 5.4 |
| 2020-21 | 65.5 | 10.0 | 7.7 | 13.9 | 2.9 | 6.2 |
| 2021-22 | 69.3 | 10.7 | 6.6 | 10.5 | 2.8 | 4.3 |
| 2022-23 | 66.0 | 11.0 | 6.4 | 14.1 | 2.5 | 4.0 |
| 2023-24 | 61.4 | 10.2 | 6.9 | 18.9 | 2.6 | 5.2 |
| 2024-25 | 58.3 | 11.3 | 7.6 | 20.8 | 2.1 | 7.3 |
| 2025-26 | 58.0 | 11.4 | 7.3 | 21.4 | 1.9 | 10.6 |
- Resources and energy, incl. gold, 2025-26
- 58.0 per cent, against 27.3 in 1970-71
- Services, 2025-26
- 21.4 per cent, against 16.5 in 1970-71
- Rural goods, 2025-26
- 11.4 per cent, against 39.3 in 1970-71
- Manufactures, 2025-26
- 7.3 per cent, against 11.9 in 1970-71
- Gold on its own
- 10.6 per cent of exports
- What was happening
- The first annual trade deficit since 2015-16, with record fuel and vehicle imports during trade disruptions in the Middle East.
- What each category holds
- Resources is metal ores and minerals, coal, other mineral fuels (mostly LNG and crude oil), metals and non-monetary gold. Rural is rural goods. Manufactures is machinery, transport equipment and other manufactures. Other is the remaining non-rural goods, goods procured in ports and merchanting. Gold is also shown on its own and is already inside resources.
- Source
- Australian Bureau of Statistics, Balance of Payments and International Investment Position, Australia, Tables 6 and 8, Goods credits and Services credits, original, June quarter 2026 release
Every slider is a normal range input, so the arrow keys move it one step and Home and End jump to the extremes.
| Share of exports of goods and services | 1970-71 | 2025-26 |
|---|---|---|
| Resources and energy, including gold | 27.3 | 58.0 |
| Services | 16.5 | 21.4 |
| Rural goods | 39.3 | 11.4 |
| Manufactures | 11.9 | 7.3 |
Resources and energy have risen from about a quarter of exports to well over half. The rise was not steady. The share was 33 per cent in 2003-04, 58 per cent at the price peak of 2011-12, fell to 48 per cent in 2015-16 when prices fell, and reached a record 69.3 per cent in 2021-22. The recovery after 2016 had two causes. The mining sector moved from its investment phase to its production phase, as the mines, railways, ports and LNG plants built during the boom began exporting. And prices rose again. In 2025-26 metal ores were about a quarter of all exports, coal and other fuels about a tenth each, and gold 10.6 per cent, up from 4.3 per cent in 2021-22 as its price rose. The Resources and Energy Quarterly puts resources and energy export earnings at about A$405 billion in 2025-26, including iron ore at A$117 billion and gold at A$68 billion.
Rural goods have fallen from the largest category to about a tenth. Farm output has grown, so the fall is relative, and it has three causes:
- world prices for farm goods are volatile, and farm trade is still heavily protected by other economies, the European Union's common agricultural policy being the standard example
- bulk farm commodities have little value added, so their prices grow more slowly than those of manufactures and services
- more frequent and severe droughts, fires and floods cut output in bad years.
The response has been a shift towards higher value niche products such as premium beef, wine and specialty grains.
Manufactures have never been a large share, and it has fallen further. Australia kept relying on primary exports while other advanced economies built large manufacturing sectors. Its manufacturing exporters have done best in sophisticated, niche products rather than high volume goods. Three things held them back:
- the mining boom lifted the dollar above parity with the United States dollar in 2011, cutting the competitiveness of every other exporter, the Dutch disease effect behind the two speed economy
- distance from markets adds transport costs
- low cost manufacturers in China and South East Asia compete with them.
Services rose from about a sixth of exports to over a fifth, with a sharp interruption. Closed borders cut services to 10.5 per cent of exports in 2021-22, because tourism and education need the customer to travel to Australia. By 2025-26 services had recovered to 21.4 per cent, and education alone was 8.2 per cent of all exports, the largest single services export. Most Australian workers are employed in services, and demand from Asia's growing middle class for education, tourism and financial services is why services are expected to supply export growth as resource earnings fall.
Common mistake
Resources are 58 per cent of exports, so mining is most of the Australian economy.
Why it happens: A share of exports is easily read as a share of output.
Mining is a much smaller share of GDP than of exports, and a smaller share again of employment, because it uses a great deal of capital and few workers. It dominates exports because nearly all of it is sold overseas, while most of what services industries produce is consumed at home. A share of exports and a share of output are different things.
Exam question
Standard · about 3 min
2 marks
In 2025-26 Australia's exports of goods and services were A$681.0 billion, of which non-monetary gold was A$72.3 billion. Calculate gold's share of total exports, as a percentage to one decimal place.
Hint 1A share is the part divided by the whole.
Hint 2Divide 72.3 by 681.0.
Hint 3Multiply by 100 and round to one decimal place.
Where students lose marks on this one
Dividing total exports by gold exports and getting 9.4.
Why it happens: The order of the division is reversed.
A share is the part over the whole, so the smaller number goes on top and the answer must be less than 100.
Written for this site.
Composition of imports: what a small high income economy buys
AnswersHow has the composition of Australia's imports changed?
Switch the composition figure to its second view. Where the export mix has changed completely, the import mix has barely moved.
| Share of imports of goods and services | 1989-90 | 2025-26 |
|---|---|---|
| Intermediate goods | 37.2 | 30.3 |
| Services | 25.7 | 26.2 |
| Consumption goods | 17.7 | 21.9 |
| Capital goods | 19.0 | 17.9 |
Intermediate goods have fallen. Before the 1990s, local content rules and tariffs on finished goods encouraged firms to import parts and assemble consumer goods in Australia. As protection was removed, it became cheaper to import the finished product, so imports shifted from parts towards finished goods. The closure of car assembly in 2017 is the clearest case.
Consumption goods rose from under a fifth of imports to about a quarter by the mid 2000s, and have stayed near that level. China and other Asian economies have a comparative advantage in manufactured consumer goods, based on lower labour costs and large scale, and lower tariffs let Australians buy them. The share was lifted to 30 per cent in 2020-21 only because services imports collapsed, and it was 21.9 per cent in 2025-26.
Capital goods have stayed near a fifth to a sixth of imports throughout. Australia makes little of the machinery and equipment its mines, farms and firms need, so investment spending pulls in imports.
Services imports are mostly Australians travelling overseas, for holidays, study and business, and the transport they pay for. That is why their share fell to 15.5 per cent in 2020-21 and rose to 26.2 per cent in 2025-26 as travel recovered, above their 1989-90 share.
Exam question
Standard · about 5 min
3 marks
Services were 25.4 per cent of Australia's imports in 2018-19, 15.5 per cent in 2020-21 and 26.2 per cent in 2025-26.
Explain these changes in the share of services in Australia's imports. (3 marks)
Hint 1What is the largest single item in Australia's services imports?
Hint 2What happened to international travel in 2020 and 2021?
Hint 3A share can change because its own value changes or because the other categories change. Check both.
Where students lose marks on this one
Explaining the fall by Australia producing more of its own finance and freight services.
Why it happens: That is a structural explanation for a gradual change, and it is sometimes taught for services imports.
A fall of ten percentage points in two years followed by a full recovery is a shock, not a structural change. The shock was closed borders.
Written for this site.
Direction: Britain, then Japan, then China
AnswersHow has the direction of Australia's trade changed?
- China
- Japan
- United States
- Korea
- India
- United Kingdom
The numbers behind this graph
| Year | China | Japan | United States | Korea | India | United Kingdom |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1989 | 2.5 | 24.1 | 11.6 | 4.4 | not published | 5.4 |
| 1990 | 2.5 | 24.2 | 11.9 | 4.9 | not published | 5.4 |
| 1991 | 2.6 | 25.1 | 10.6 | 5.2 | not published | 5.1 |
| 1992 | 2.8 | 23.6 | 9.5 | 5.3 | not published | 5.6 |
| 1993 | 3.2 | 23.0 | 9.1 | 5.9 | not published | 5.7 |
| 1994 | 3.7 | 22.7 | 8.3 | 6.3 | not published | 5.0 |
| 1995 | 3.7 | 21.1 | 7.8 | 7.4 | not published | 4.7 |
| 1996 | 4.2 | 19.1 | 8.0 | 8.2 | not published | 5.1 |
| 1997 | 3.9 | 18.1 | 8.8 | 6.9 | not published | 4.3 |
| 1998 | 3.7 | 18.0 | 10.9 | 5.7 | not published | 6.6 |
| 1999 | 4.1 | 17.3 | 11.2 | 6.0 | 1.7 | 6.1 |
| 2000 | 4.7 | 17.2 | 11.5 | 6.8 | 1.6 | 5.3 |
| 2001 | 5.6 | 17.0 | 10.4 | 6.7 | 1.9 | 5.9 |
| 2002 | 6.4 | 16.2 | 10.4 | 7.1 | 1.9 | 6.3 |
| 2003 | 7.7 | 15.5 | 9.7 | 6.4 | 2.7 | 8.2 |
| 2004 | 8.7 | 16.0 | 8.8 | 6.6 | 4.0 | 6.2 |
| 2005 | 10.4 | 17.3 | 7.6 | 6.8 | 4.5 | 5.5 |
| 2006 | 11.2 | 16.7 | 7.4 | 6.7 | 4.9 | 6.4 |
| 2007 | 12.6 | 15.6 | 7.2 | 7.0 | 5.1 | 5.6 |
| 2008 | 13.3 | 18.8 | 6.5 | 7.3 | 5.9 | 5.1 |
| 2009 | 19.0 | 15.9 | 6.1 | 7.0 | 7.2 | 5.4 |
| 2010 | 22.4 | 15.8 | 5.1 | 7.8 | 6.9 | 4.4 |
| 2011 | 24.4 | 16.4 | 4.9 | 7.9 | 5.7 | 3.8 |
| 2012 | 24.4 | 16.3 | 5.0 | 7.1 | 4.7 | 3.7 |
| 2013 | 29.0 | 15.3 | 5.1 | 6.6 | 3.6 | 2.7 |
| 2014 | 27.6 | 15.1 | 5.8 | 6.7 | 3.5 | 2.7 |
| 2015 | 26.8 | 13.0 | 7.1 | 6.3 | 4.3 | 2.9 |
| 2016 | 28.4 | 11.4 | 6.5 | 6.1 | 4.5 | 4.6 |
| 2017 | 30.0 | 12.2 | 5.7 | 6.1 | 5.2 | 3.0 |
| 2018 | 31.1 | 13.4 | 5.5 | 6.1 | 5.1 | 2.4 |
| 2019 | 34.2 | 12.3 | 5.4 | 5.7 | 4.4 | 4.3 |
| 2020 | 36.6 | 10.6 | 6.7 | 5.8 | 3.9 | 4.4 |
| 2021 | 36.4 | 12.5 | 5.0 | 7.3 | 4.7 | 1.7 |
| 2022 | 27.6 | 17.8 | 5.0 | 8.0 | 5.2 | 1.3 |
| 2023 | 32.3 | 13.4 | 5.4 | 6.5 | 5.2 | 2.1 |
| 2024 | 30.4 | 11.7 | 6.4 | 6.5 | 5.5 | 2.7 |
| 2025 | 29.4 | 9.8 | 9.0 | 6.7 | 4.9 | 4.7 |
- Largest market in 2025
- China, 29.4 per cent of exports
- The rest, in order
- Japan 9.8, United States 9.0, Korea 6.7, India 4.9, United Kingdom 4.7
- These six together
- 64.5 per cent of all exports
- What was happening
- China still takes over a quarter of exports. The jump in the United States and United Kingdom shares is mostly gold, whose price rose sharply.
- Source
- Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia's direction of goods and services trade, calendar years (1989 to 2006 historical file, updated September 2024; 2007 to 2025 file, updated August 2026)
Every slider is a normal range input, so the arrow keys move it one step and Home and End jump to the extremes.
From Britain to Japan. Britain took around half of Australian exports before the Second World War. Its share fell through the 1950s and 1960s, and Britain's entry to the European Economic Community in 1973 closed its market to Australian farm goods behind the common external tariff. Japan took Britain's place, as its rapid industrialisation from the 1960s created demand for Australian coal and iron ore, and it was the largest market until the 2000s. Japan's share then fell, because its growth slowed from the 1990s and other markets grew faster, and it was 9.8 per cent in 2025.
From Japan to China. China's share rose from 2.5 per cent in 1989 to 19.0 per cent in 2009, when it overtook Japan. Chinese industrialisation, and above all its steel production, created demand for iron ore and coal on a scale no economy had generated before. China's share peaked at 36.6 per cent in 2020. From 2020 China restricted imports of Australian barley, wine, coal, beef, lobster and timber, and at the same time the invasion of Ukraine raised coal and gas prices, which lifted the shares of Japan and Korea, the largest buyers of Australian energy. China's share fell to 27.6 per cent in 2022. The restrictions were lifted in stages, the last in December 2024, and China took 29.4 per cent in 2025.
| Largest export markets, 2024-25 | Share of exports | Change in value on 2023-24 |
|---|---|---|
| China | 29.2 | down 11.2 per cent |
| Japan | 10.8 | down 13.5 per cent |
| United States | 8.4 | up 44.0 per cent |
| Korea | 6.4 | down 2.4 per cent |
| India | 5.4 | up 2.1 per cent |
| United Kingdom | 3.7 | up 57.6 per cent |
Two features of that table need care. China's fall in 2024-25 was mostly lower iron ore and coal prices. And the rise in exports to the United States and the United Kingdom was mostly gold, whose price rose sharply. It is not a sign that Australia is selling more of its usual exports to those economies.
Common mistake
Exports to the United States rose 44 per cent in 2024-25, so Australia is diversifying away from China towards the United States.
Why it happens: A large percentage change reads as a change in strategy.
The increase was mostly non-monetary gold, sold into financial markets in New York and London as the gold price rose. It says nothing about demand for Australia's other exports and would reverse if the gold price fell. Before using a change in direction as evidence, check what was being sold.
The direction of imports has moved less. China has been the largest source of imports for most of the past two decades and supplied 19.1 per cent in 2024-25, followed by the United States at 15.4 per cent. South East Asian economies together supplied 18.1 per cent and the European Union 13.2 per cent. Australia still buys a large share of its capital equipment and high value manufactures from advanced economies, and its consumer goods from China and South East Asia.
Advanced economies still matter indirectly. Much of the iron ore and coal sold to China becomes steel, machinery and consumer goods sold to the United States and Europe. A recession there cuts demand for Chinese output and so for Australian resources, even though little Australian trade goes to those economies directly.
Exam question
Harder · about 2 min
1 mark
China's share of Australia's exports fell from 36.6 per cent in 2020 to 27.6 per cent in 2022, while Japan's rose from 10.6 to 17.8 per cent. Which explanation best accounts for both changes?
Hint 1Two things happened between 2020 and 2022. One was about China specifically; one was about world prices.
Hint 2What does Japan mostly buy from Australia?
Hint 3Was iron ore ever on China's restricted list?
Where students lose marks on this one
Choosing the iron ore option.
Why it happens: Iron ore is the largest export to China, so a fall in China's share is assumed to be iron ore.
Iron ore was never restricted. The restrictions fell on goods China could buy elsewhere.
Written for this site.
Exam question
Harder · about 2 min
1 mark
A student writes: 'Exports to the United States rose 44 per cent and exports to the United Kingdom rose 58 per cent in 2024-25, which shows Australia is successfully diversifying its trade away from China.' What is wrong with this?
Hint 1Ask what was being sold before asking where it went.
Hint 2Which Australian export rose most in value in 2024-25 and 2025-26?
Hint 3Where is most of the world's gold traded?
Where students lose marks on this one
Accepting large percentage changes as evidence of a change in strategy.
Why it happens: Large percentage changes look significant on their own.
Check what was sold and whether the change would last before using it as evidence.
Written for this site.
Exam question
Straightforward · about 2 min
2 marks
Put these economies in the order in which each became Australia's largest export market: China, the United Kingdom, Japan.
- China
- United Kingdom
- Japan
Hint 1Which economy was Australia's main market in the first half of the twentieth century?
Hint 2Which economy's industrialisation from the 1960s created demand for Australian coal and iron ore?
Hint 3In which year did China's share pass Japan's?
Where students lose marks on this one
Placing China before Japan.
Why it happens: China dominates current discussion of Australian trade.
Japan was the largest market for about four decades before China overtook it in 2009.
Written for this site.
Dependence on one buyer and a few products
The pattern that made Australia rich also concentrated its risk. Three commodities, iron ore, coal and gas, and one buyer, China, account for a large part of export income. The China restrictions from 2020 showed the risk and its limits. The goods China restricted were mostly ones it could buy elsewhere, such as barley, wine and coal, and Australian exporters found other markets for much of them. Iron ore was never restricted, because China could not replace it quickly. Dependence runs both ways when the good is hard to substitute.
The policy response has been diversification: agreements with India from December 2022 and with the United Kingdom from May 2023, the upgrade of the agreement with South East Asia and New Zealand, and a stated focus on South East Asia and India. So far the shares have moved little. India took 5.4 per cent of exports in 2024-25.
What the forecasts say about the next decade
The Resources and Energy Quarterly forecasts resources and energy export earnings to fall from about A$405 billion in 2025-26 to about A$371 billion in 2030-31. Iron ore earnings are forecast to fall from A$117 billion to A$77 billion as Chinese steel output declines and new supply arrives from Guinea. Thermal coal is expected to fall as Asian economies decarbonise.
Growth is expected in the minerals used in batteries and renewable energy, such as lithium, copper, nickel and rare earths, and in services. These are smaller than iron ore today. Lithium exports were about A$9.9 billion in 2025-26, less than a tenth of iron ore, so the change in composition will be gradual.
Essay planpriority 13 of 16 · 20 marks
Analyse the causes of recent trends in the value, composition and direction of Australia's trade.
- Analyse
- Break the situation into its parts and show how they relate and affect each other.
- Thesis
- Australia's trade pattern is the result of comparative advantage in resources meeting the industrialisation of its Asian neighbours, on top of a policy decision in the 1980s to open the economy. Liberalisation explains the rising level of trade. Asian demand explains its composition and direction. World commodity prices explain why the value, and the trade balance, have swung so far since 2019.
Trade liberalisation from the 1980s raised the level of Australia's trade.
Keep this paragraph about the level. Liberalisation does not explain why Australia trades iron ore with China. That belongs to the next two paragraphs.
- Theory
- Lower tariffs and quotas reduce the price of imports and remove the protection that kept resources in import competing industries. Resources move to industries with a comparative advantage, which export, so both imports and exports rise. A floating exchange rate lets the dollar adjust to trade shocks.
- Diagram
- The trade value figure, share of GDP view, with the float and the tariff cuts marked.
- Evidence
- The float in December 1983; tariff cuts across the economy through the 1980s and 1990s; trade openness from 27 per cent of GDP in 1959-60 to 46.8 per cent in 2025-26; 19 free trade agreements in force by 2026, most recently with the United Arab Emirates from October 2025.
- Against
- Openness is still below that of most small advanced economies, because distance and a large non traded services sector limit how much Australia trades.
Asian industrialisation changed the composition of exports towards resources and energy.
The counter strengthens the analysis. Services growth rests on the same demand, Asia's rising incomes, applied to a different comparative advantage.
- Theory
- Comparative advantage rests on factor endowments. Industrialising economies need steel and energy, which use iron ore, metallurgical coal and gas, and Australia has very large reserves close to Asian markets. Investment during the boom raised capacity, and the move to the production phase raised volumes.
- Diagram
- The composition figure, exports view, with the resources line against rural goods.
- Evidence
- Resources and energy from 27.3 per cent of exports in 1970-71 to a record 69.3 per cent in 2021-22 and 58.0 per cent in 2025-26; rural goods from 39.3 to 11.4 per cent; iron ore earnings about A\$117 billion in 2025-26; gold 10.6 per cent of exports in 2025-26.
- Against
- Services have also grown, to 21.4 per cent in 2025-26, with education 8.2 per cent of exports, so the change is not only towards resources.
The same industrialisation moved the direction of exports from Britain to Japan to China.
Show that the direction and composition are one change. China buys what Australia's endowment produces, so the two trends have a single cause.
- Theory
- Trade flows to the economies whose demand is growing fastest for what an exporter produces. Trade diversion from a customs union can close a market to outsiders.
- Diagram
- The export direction figure, with China's share against Japan's.
- Evidence
- Britain's entry to the European Economic Community in 1973; Japan's industrialisation from the 1960s; China from 2.5 per cent of exports in 1989 to 19.0 per cent in 2009, when it overtook Japan, a peak of 36.6 per cent in 2020 and 29.4 per cent in 2025; the China restrictions from 2020, lifted by December 2024.
- Against
- The share of China has fallen from its peak, and the rise in exports to the United States and the United Kingdom in 2024-25 might look like diversification, but it was mostly gold.
World commodity prices explain the recent swings in the value of trade and the trade balance.
This is where the judgement belongs. The structural causes explain the pattern, and prices explain the swings, so a forecast of Australia's trade balance is mostly a forecast of commodity prices.
- Theory
- The value of exports is price times quantity. Resource supply is inelastic in the short run, so a change in world prices changes export income almost one for one. Imports follow domestic spending and move more slowly, so the balance absorbs the price change.
- Diagram
- The trade value figure, trade balance view, from 2016 to 2026.
- Evidence
- A record surplus of A\$122.2 billion in 2021-22 after Russia's invasion of Ukraine; A\$15.0 billion in 2024-25 as coal, gas and iron ore prices fell; a deficit of A\$7.5 billion in 2025-26, the first since 2015-16, with record fuel and vehicle imports in the June quarter 2026; the Resources and Energy Quarterly forecast of resources earnings falling to about A\$371 billion by 2030-31.
- Against
- Gold's price rise in 2025 and 2026 raised export earnings at the same time, which shows that the effect of prices depends on the mix of commodities rather than a single price.
Judgement
The structural causes, comparative advantage and Asian industrialisation, set the pattern, and they change slowly. The cyclical cause, commodity prices, moves the value by tens of billions of dollars a year, and it explains every large change in the trade balance since 2019. A response should separate the two, because the structural pattern is stable while the value is not.
The full response also needs: Define value, composition and direction at the start. If the question includes financial flows, the next lesson supplies the debt and equity half. If it asks for effects, the balance of payments and terms of trade lessons supply them.
Exam question
Hardest asked · about 15 min
8 marks
Analyse the causes of changes in the value, composition and direction of Australia's trade since the 1980s. (8 marks)
Hint 1Analyse means identify the causes and show how each produced the change. Cover all three dimensions.
Hint 2Separate the policy cause (liberalisation from 1983) from the demand cause (Asian industrialisation) and from prices.
Hint 3Use figures: openness, the resources share, China's share and the recent swing in the trade balance.
Where students lose marks on this one
Describing the trends with figures but never giving their causes.
Why it happens: The data is easier to recall than the mechanism.
Analyse asks why. Every figure should follow a sentence saying what caused it.
Using the 2024-25 rise in exports to the United States as evidence of diversification.
Why it happens: The percentage change is large and recent.
The rise was mostly gold. Use India, South East Asia and the new agreements as the evidence of diversification, and note how little the shares have moved.
Written for this site.