HSC Study

Investment and Transnational Corporations

The difference control makes, where the world's direct investment actually went in 2025, and the bargain a host economy strikes when a transnational arrives.

45 min · HSC Topic One - The Global Economy

Assumes you have read Financial Flows.

The full teaching. Start here.

The short version

  • Foreign direct investment is the purchase or establishment of a controlling interest, conventionally ten per cent or more of the voting power, in a foreign enterprise. Long term, equity only, and it carries management control with it.
  • Foreign portfolio investment buys equity and debt securities without control. Shorter term, tradeable, no say in the business.
  • The distinction that earns the mark is control, because control is what brings technology and management know how with the money.
  • World inflows rose 6 per cent to about US$1.6 trillion in 2025, and the developing economies received US$901 billion against US$723 billion for the developed economies, a reversal of the historical pattern that dates from 2020.
  • But the recovery is concentrated: the top twenty host economies took more than 80 per cent of world inflows, and the least developed economies took US$43 billion.
  • Transnational corporations organise this. They account for roughly half of world trade, and the global value chains they run account for around 80 per cent of it.

The judgement the exam wants: direct investment is the most developmentally useful flow and the most unequally distributed one, and the same feature, control, explains both.

Direct investment and portfolio investment

AnswersWhat is the difference between foreign direct investment and foreign portfolio investment?

Investment is distinguished from finance by horizon and intent: finance is short term and passive, investment is long term and aims at ownership. Within investment, the same two tests separate the two kinds.

Foreign direct investmentFDI

The purchase or establishment of a controlling interest in a foreign enterprise, conventionally ten per cent or more of the voting power. Long term, equity only, and it carries management control and the transfer of technology and know how with it.

Foreign portfolio investment

The purchase of equity and debt securities without a controlling interest. Shorter term, tradeable, and the investor has no say in how the business is run.

Direct investmentPortfolio investment
ThresholdTen per cent or more of voting powerBelow ten per cent
HorizonLong term, illiquidShort term, tradeable
InstrumentsEquity onlyEquity and debt securities
ControlThe investor appoints directors and sets strategyNone
What travels with itTechnology, management methods, access to the parent's marketsMoney only
Behaviour in a downturnSticky, because a factory cannot be sold in an afternoonVolatile, and the first thing sold in a loss of confidence

Common mistake

Buying shares in a foreign company is foreign direct investment.

Why it happens: Both involve buying equity abroad, so the distinction feels like a technicality.

The distinction is control, and the marker is looking for the word. Below the ten per cent threshold it is portfolio investment: you own a claim on the profits and nothing else. At or above it, it is direct investment: you appoint directors, you set strategy, and the technology and management practices of the parent come with you. That transfer is why direct investment matters for development in a way portfolio investment does not, and why a developing economy will compete hard for the first and worry about the second.

CheckpointAnswer before reading on.

A Japanese manufacturer buys 30 per cent of the shares in an Australian battery producer and appoints two of its seven directors.

How is this transaction classified, and why?

Select one answer

Hint 1The classification turns on one number and one idea.

Hint 2The threshold is ten per cent of voting power.

Hint 3Above the threshold, what does the investor get besides a claim on profits?

Investment flows grew for the same two reasons finance did, because the removal of capital controls in the 1970s and 1980s opened both channels at once and communications technology then made a subsidiary on another continent manageable. Three further causes are specific to investment: the opening of previously closed economies, particularly China from 1978 and the transition economies after 1989; a dense network of bilateral investment treaties and free trade agreement chapters guaranteeing the right to repatriate profits; and the merger and acquisition cycle, since a large share of measured direct investment is one firm buying another rather than anything new being built.

That last point explains the timing of the series. Direct investment follows the business cycle with a lag, because building a factory is a decision made on expectations rather than on today's conditions, and it is dominated by a small number of very large deals. It fell about 35 per cent in 2020 when border closures stalled existing projects, rebounded strongly in 2021 on merger activity and infrastructure stimulus, and weakened again from 2022 as higher policy interest rates raised the cost of borrowing and the war in Ukraine raised the risk premium on cross border projects.

Where direct investment actually goes

AnswersHas foreign direct investment shifted towards developing economies?

The total is the less interesting half of this dot point. The direction is where the marks are, and it has changed twice.

Where foreign direct investment went, and whether the gap is closingIn 2025 the developed economies received US$723 billion of direct investment and the developing economies US$901 billion, growing at 11 and 2 per cent respectively.Developed economies723Developing economies901Developing Asia644Latin America and the Caribbean188Africa70Least developed countries430250500750100012501500Inflows of foreign direct investment (US$ billion)
The headline in 2025 was a recovery: world inflows rose 6 per cent to about US$1.6 trillion after two years of falling. The examinable point is underneath it. Inflows to the developed economies rose 11 per cent and inflows to the developing economies rose 2 per cent, so the recovery went disproportionately to the economies that needed it least, and the least developed economies still took under 3 per cent of the world total. Carrying those two growth rates forward is a projection rather than a forecast, and its only purpose is to show which way the gap is moving.
The numbers behind this graph
DestinationInflows 2025, US$ billionChange on 2024, %
World16006
Developed economies72311
Developing economies9012
Developing Asia644not stated
Latin America and the Caribbean18814
Africa70not stated
Least developed countries4321
2
0
Developing economies
US$901 billion of inflows in 2025, up 2 per cent on 2024
World total
US$1600 billion in 2025, up 6 per cent, ending two years of decline
Developing share of the two group totals
55.5 per cent
Why the recovery is narrower than the headline
The top twenty host economies took more than 80 per cent of world inflows, the United States alone took US$277 billion, and much of the rise was a handful of very large data centre and artificial intelligence projects. Cross border mergers and acquisitions fell 7 per cent in the same year.
What the projection is not
A single year of growth is not a trend, and direct investment is the most volatile of the long term flows because one megaproject can move a region. Read the slider as a statement about direction, never as a forecast.
Source
UN Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2026: International investment in a turbulent era, 2025 data, published June 2026

Every slider is a normal range input, so the arrow keys move it one step and Home and End jump to the extremes.

Traditionally direct investment went to the advanced economies, which had the industrial capacity, the infrastructure and the rich consumer markets. Since 2020 the flow to developing and emerging economies has exceeded the flow to developed ones, because the return on capital is higher where the capital stock is thinner and growth is faster. In 2025 the developing economies received about US$901 billion against US$723 billion for the developed economies, with developing Asia taking about US$644 billion of it, and Latin America and the Caribbean growing 14 per cent to US$188 billion.

The second change is in the source. Emerging economies are now investors and not only destinations. Chinese state owned transnationals invest across Africa, Latin America and Central Asia under the Belt and Road Initiative, which reached a record US$213.5 billion of contracts and investments signed in 2025, about US$1.4 trillion cumulatively since 2013, with Africa the largest recipient region at US$61.2 billion, up 283 per cent on 2024, and about 43 per cent of the total going to energy. Note the basis carefully: that is engagement signed, not money disbursed, and it is a private research count rather than an official Chinese statistic, because China does not publish a comparable series.

The qualification that turns this into evaluation

The headline sounds like convergence, so the marks are in the caveat. The recovery in 2025 was concentrated: the top twenty host economies took more than 80 per cent of world inflows, the United States alone took US$277 billion, the least developed economies received US$43 billion, and much of the increase was a handful of very large data centre and artificial intelligence projects. Announced greenfield investment in strategic sectors reached 44 per cent of total value against 16 per cent in 2020, and only about a tenth of that went to low and lower middle income economies across 2020 to 2025. So investment is flowing to developing economies in aggregate while bypassing the poorest of them, which is the same finding the development dot point reaches from the other direction.

Exam question

Harder · about 10 min

6 marks

Analyse the causes of recent changes in the composition and direction of world trade and investment flows. (6 marks)

Hint 1Composition is what is traded. Direction is who trades with whom. Deal with them separately and say so.

Hint 2For composition, think about what rising incomes do to the mix of demand, and what digital delivery does to which services can be traded at all.

Hint 3For direction, one structural cause runs through industrialisation and one policy cause runs through security. They point different ways.

Where students lose marks on this one
  • Confusing composition with direction and answering one question twice.

    Why it happens: Both words describe the pattern of trade, and both are taught in the same lesson.

    Composition answers 'what'. Direction answers 'where from and where to'. Writing the two headings before starting prevents the collapse.

  • Quoting a trade share without saying whether it is a value or a volume.

    Why it happens: Published series are usually values, and the distinction is invisible in the number.

    Values move with prices. The jump in trade as a share of output in 2022 is substantially the commodity price spike after the invasion of Ukraine, not a jump in the quantity traded, and saying so demonstrates exactly the data-analysis skill the question rewards.

Written for this site.

Transnational corporations and global value chains

AnswersWhat role do transnational corporations play in globalisation?

Transnational corporationTNC

A firm that produces and sells in more than one economy, normally through subsidiaries established or acquired by foreign direct investment. Transnationals account for roughly half of world trade, and the global value chains they organise account for around eighty per cent of it.

A transnational acquires that control in one of four ways: incorporating a wholly owned subsidiary, acquiring shares in an associated enterprise, merging with or acquiring an unrelated firm, or entering an equity joint venture. Whichever route it takes, the effect on integration is the same, because the firm now has production in one economy and owners in another.

Global value chain

A production process split into stages located in different economies under the centralised control of one firm. Raw material extraction, component manufacture, assembly, distribution and after sales service are placed wherever each is cheapest, and the components cross borders repeatedly as the product is built.

The typical chain places manufacturing where labour costs and regulatory burdens are low, often in special economic zones; customises and distributes in high income markets; and offshores service functions such as call centres to a third location. A smartphone designed in the United States, built from Korean, Japanese and Taiwanese components, assembled in China and sold worldwide is the standard example, and it is also the reason gross trade statistics overstate the Chinese contribution.

Chain of reasoning

Transnationals in a host economy: the bargain and its price

  1. Capital, technology and management know how rises

    The subsidiary brings a capital stock the host could not finance and production methods it could not develop, and the know how spreads to local suppliers and to workers who move on.

  2. Employment, exports and tax revenue rises

    The subsidiary hires, sells abroad from the host, and pays company tax there.

  3. The incentives offered to attract it falls

    Governments compete for the investment with tax concessions, infrastructure and lighter labour and environmental regulation, which transfers part of the gain back to the firm before it arrives.

  4. Profit shifting and repatriation falls

    Profits are shifted to low tax jurisdictions through transfer pricing, so the tax revenue arrives smaller than the activity suggests, and dividends remitted to the parent are a debit on the host's current account.

  5. Market power in the host economy falls

    Cross border cartels and acquisitions of local rivals reduce competition, and the fines regulators impose recover only the harm they manage to detect.

Where it breaks: The balance depends on the host's bargaining power. An economy with a large market or a scarce resource sets better terms than one competing on cost alone.

The policy response to the fourth link is worth naming precisely, because it is recent and examinable. A global minimum corporate tax rate of fifteen per cent on the profits of large multinational groups was agreed through the G7 and then the OECD and G20 inclusive framework from 2021, and Australia legislated its version for income years beginning on or after 1 January 2024. It does not stop profit shifting. It removes most of the gain from shifting profit to a jurisdiction taxing below fifteen per cent, because the difference is topped up elsewhere.

Common mistake

Transnationals are the cause of the gains a developing economy makes from investment.

Why it happens: The firm is visible, the investment arrives with it, and the growth follows.

The firm supplies capital and technology; whether the host captures any of the gain depends on the terms. An economy that bids away its company tax, its labour standards and its environmental regulation to win the subsidiary may end with employment and very little else, because the profit leaves and the tax was conceded in advance. The examinable point is conditionality, not causation: direct investment raises host incomes where the host has the bargaining power or the institutions to hold on to part of the return.

Exam question

Hardest asked · about 10 min

6 marks

Analyse the benefits and costs for a host economy of attracting a transnational corporation through foreign direct investment.

Hint 1Direct investment differs from portfolio investment because it carries control, and control carries technology and management methods.

Hint 2Ask what the host gives up in order to win the investment, before the firm has even arrived.

Hint 3A strong answer makes the outcome conditional on something, rather than tallying good points against bad ones.

Where students lose marks on this one
  • Listing benefits and costs without weighing them.

    Why it happens: Analyse is read as a request for two lists.

    Analyse requires the relationship between the parts. State what the outcome depends on, which here is the host's bargaining power, and the list becomes an argument.

  • Saying transnationals cause development in host economies.

    Why it happens: The investment arrives and growth follows, so the causation looks direct.

    The firm supplies capital and technology; whether the host keeps any of the return depends on the terms it conceded. Make the claim conditional.

Written for this site.

Why the supply chain became a security question

For thirty years firms placed each stage of production wherever it was cheapest, and governments treated the result as efficiency. Two shocks changed the way the same structure is read.

The pandemic in 2020 showed that a chain optimised for cost has no slack: a single closed plant in one economy stopped assembly lines everywhere, because the input had exactly one source. The invasion of Ukraine in 2022 then showed that a dependence created for commercial reasons can be used for political ones, most visibly in European gas.

The response has been to rebuild parts of those chains on criteria other than cost, which is why announced greenfield investment in strategic sectors has risen from 16 per cent of value in 2020 to 44 per cent in 2025. That is the investment channel reacting to the same forces that flattened the goods trade channel, and it shows up as a change in composition rather than a fall in the total.

Two consequences for an extended response. First, this is a genuine change in what direct investment is for, so treating post 2022 investment data as a continuation of the 1990s pattern misreads it. Second, redirected investment is still cross border investment, so the correct claim is that the pattern of integration has changed, not that integration has reversed.

Is eighty per cent of trade really inside value chains?

Use the figure, but understand what it counts. The claim is that around 80 per cent of world trade takes place within the production networks that transnationals organise, not that transnationals own 80 per cent of it. A great deal of that trade is between independent firms that happen to be links in a chain a lead firm coordinates through contracts rather than ownership.

The distinction matters when you evaluate policy. If the chain runs on ownership, a host government can regulate the subsidiary. If it runs on contracts, the lead firm can relocate the order to another supplier in another economy at the end of the contract, which is precisely why bargaining power in a value chain sits with whoever holds the design, the brand and the customer rather than with whoever holds the factory.